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SUMMARY
•	The	 democracy	 assistance	 programmes	
of	 the	 Visegrad	 countries	 remain	 modest	 in	
financial	 terms,	 but	 the	 democracy	 know-how	
and	 commitment	 of	 their	 NGOs	 involved	 in	
democracy	assistance	is	high-level
•	Visegrad	 democracy	 assistance	 budgets	
have	more	 than	 doubled	 in	 recent	 years,	 the	
growth	 is	 continuing,	 and	 some	 progress	 has	
been	made	in	grant-making	procedures
•	V4	 countries	 need	 to	 better	 strategise	 their	
assistance	 programmes	 and	 make	 the	 whole	
process	 more	 transparent.	 They	 should	 also	
clearly	 distinguish	 democracy	 assistance	
programmes	 from	 other	 official	 development	
aid	(ODA)	activities.
•	Visegrad	 governments	 should	 continue	 their	
peer	 pressure	 on	 target-country	 politicians	 for	
further	 democratisation,	 and	 in	 the	 western	
Balkans	and	Ukraine	 remain	advocates	of	 the	
respective	countries'	European	aspirations
•	Visegrad	 countries	 are	 well	 placed,	
through	 their	 EU	 accession	 experience,	 to	
assist	 neighbouring	 countries	 in	 the	 European	
integration	process	
•	Sustainable	partnerships	should	be	built	with	
local	 actors	 in	 target	 countries,	 and	 Visegrad	
embassies	 in	 these	 countries	 should	 increase	
their	direct	support	to	local	NGOs
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New kids on the block
Can the Visegrad Four emerge as effective players 
in international democracy assistance?
As active new donors in international democracy assistance, the new EU member states 
have limited financial resources, but their fresh transition experience brings advantages 
over the practices of more established European democracies
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•	Visegrad	 countries	 should	 significantly	
improve	 the	 co-ordination	 of	 democracy	
assistance	 programmes,	 and	 set	 up	 a	 joint	
Visegrad	Democracy	Fund	
•	Visegrad	 countries’	 democracy	 assistance	
should	 become	 aligned	 with	 EU	 and	 other	
big	 donors’	 activities.	 This	 can	 be	 achieved	
by	 providing	 matching	 funding	 for	 grants	
from	 larger	 donors,	 including	 the	 EU,	as	well	
as	 through	 support	 for	 the	 newly	 established	
European	 Foundation	 for	 Democracy	 through	
Partnership.
•	The	capacity	of	Visegrad	civil	society	groups	
needs	to	be	strengthened	so	that	they	gain	the	
attention	 of	 EU	 institutions,	 and	 can	 become	
significant	 players	 in	 international	 democracy	
assistance.	
New players with fresh 
transition experience ...
The	 support	 given	 during	 the	 1990s	 to	 the	
emerging	 democracies	 of	 Central	 Europe	 in	
the	 process	 of	 their	 transition	 to	 full-fledged	
democracies	 was	 arguably	 the	 greatest	
achievement	of	the	European	Union	to	date.	Ten	
former	 communist	 countries	are	now	members	
of	the	EU,	and	more	are	expected	to	follow	in	
the	coming	decade.	
The	success	of	the	Visegrad	Four	countries,	plus	
Slovenia	and	the	Baltic	states,	has	propelled	them	
into	the	position	of	stable	market	economies	with	
an	increasing	interest	in	spreading	the	benefits	
of	democratisation	 to	 their	 eastern	 neighbours	
and.	 in	 the	case	of	 the	Czech	Republic,	even	
further	afield.	
The	 zeal	 to	 spread	 the	 successful	 central	
European	experience	of	democratic	transition	is	
far	from	exhaustion,	and	the	new	EU	members	
show	a	particular	interest	in	securing	a	greater	
place	for	democracy	promotion	on	the	agenda	
of	the	EU,	in	particular	in	the	context	of	the	EU's	
eastern	neighbours.	Concerns	over	a	backlash	
against	 the	 "freedom"	 and	 "anti-terrorism"	
agenda	of	the	current	Bush	Administration	in	the	
United	States	resonate	in	 the	Middle	East,	but	
less	so	in	other	parts	of	Asia	and	Africa,	or	in	
the	former	Soviet	bloc1.	
Likewise,	in	central	Europe	the	memories	persist	
of	 the	strong	US	support	(both	US	government	
and	George	Soros's	Open	Society	 Institute)	 to	
dissident	 movements,	 such	 as	 Charter	 77	 in	
then	Czechoslovakia	and	Solidarity	in	Poland,	
when	 there	 was	 much	 less	 EU	 engagement	
in	 the	communist	bloc.	 The	 recent	US	 support	
for	 a	 NATO	 membership	 action	 plan	 for	
Georgia	 and	 Ukraine	 reiterated	 that	 the	 US	
continues	to	engage	more	actively	than	the	EU	
in	many	countries	where	democracy	is	not	yet	
consolidated.
“In	our	country,	there	will	be	no	pink	or	orange,	
or	 even	 banana,	 revolution,”	 commented	
Belarusian	President	Alexander	Lukashenko	after	
the	election	of	Viktor	Yushchenko	as	President	of	
Ukraine	 in	 January	2005.	“All	 those	coloured	
revolutions	are	pure	and	simple	banditry,”	said	
Lukashenko,	who	 proceded	 to	 have	 countless	
opposition	 figures	 arrested	 during	 the	 2006	
presidential	election	campaign	in	Belarus.	
One	of	the	opposition	presidential	candidates,	
Alexander	Kazulin,	has	still	not	been	released.	
Three	 of	 the	 Visegrad	 Four	 countries	 border	
on	 Ukraine,	 while	 Poland	 also	 borders	 with	
Belarus	and	the	Russian	enclave	of	Kaliningrad.	
The	need	to	end	autocratic	rule,	and	to	support	
consolidating	 democracies,	 will	 remain	 high	
on	 the	Visegrad	countries'	agenda	so	 long	as	
tyranny	persists	on	their	doorstep.
With	 their	 intimate	 knowledge	 of	 the	 EU	
accession	 process,	 the	 Visegrad	 Four	 (V4)	
countries	are	also	in	a	position	to	draw	on	the	
"soft	power"	credibility	of	the	EU,	but	at	the	same	
time	 on	 their	 own	 experience	 of	 engagement	
with	US	democracy	promotion.	
1	 The Backlash Against Democracy Assistance,	A	
Report	prepared	by	the	National	Endowment	for	Democracy	
for	Senator	Richard	G.	Lugar,	Chairman,	Committee	on	
Foreign	Relations,	United	States	Senate,	National	Endowment	
for	Democracy,	8	June	2006
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The	democracy	assistance	programmes	of	 the	
V4	countries	remain	at	a	relatively	early	stage	in	
their	formation,	but	the	democracy	know-how	of	
the	countries	goes	far	beyond	their	governments'	
own	programmes.	
There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 dynamic	 V4	 non-
governmental	 organisations	 (NGOs),	 for	
instance	Pontis	Foundation	and	People	in	Peril	
in	 Slovakia,	 People	 in	 Need	 in	 the	 Czech	
Republic,	 and	 the	 organisations	 active	 under	
the	umbrella	of	“Grupa	Zagranica”	in	Poland,	
working	to	strengthen	non-governmental	 forces	
and	 human	 rights	 campaigners	 in	 autocratic	
regimes,	 for	 instance	 in	 Belarus,	 Cuba,	 and	
Burma.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 other	 NGOs	 such	 as	 the	
government-supported	 International	 Centre	 for	
Democratic	 Transition	 (ICDT)	 in	 Hungary,	 are	
building	up	expertise	in	supporting	democratic	
structures	 in	 both	 governmental	 and	 non-
governmental	sectors,	particularly	in	the	western	
Balkans,	but	more	recently	also	in	Belarus.	
Moreover,	consultants	and	even	some	diplomats	
from	 the	 new	 member	 states,	 notably	 the	
Visegrad	countries	and	 the	Baltic	 states,	 have	
a	 high	 reputation	 in	 the	western	 Balkans	 and	
in	 Ukraine,	 as	 they	 perceive	 the	 European	
integration	 process	 through	 applicants'	 eyes,	
and	 they	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 understand	 and	
even	 speak	 the	 local	 language.	 Consultants	
from	 the	 V4	 countries	 are	 also	 increasingly	
hired	by	US	and	other	western	governments	and	
development	agencies,	as	they	are	competitive	
and	 have	 an	 intimate	 understanding	 of	 the	
transition	process.	
... but effective funding 
structures and policies 
not yet in place
There	 is	 no	 single	 V4	 approach	 to	 funding	
or	 modes	 of	 democracy	 assistance,	 and	 co-
ordination	 of	 their	 still	 modest	 resources	 is	
limited	to	the	International	Visegrad	Fund	-	with	
a	budget	of	€	5	million	in	2007,	only	a	fraction	
of	which	goes	to	democracy	projects.	
Moreover,	 the	 respective	 V4	governments	 are	
only	 now	 beginning	 to	 set	 up	 development	
aid	agencies,	 let	alone	democracy	assistance	
agencies	 (with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 Transition	
Policy	 Department	 at	 the	 Czech	 Ministry	
of	 Foreign	 Affairs).	 Moreover,	 small	 grants	
administered	 by	 embassies	 are	 blunted	 by	
slow,	 centralised	 decision-making	 processes,	
combined	with	limited	embassy	staff	resources	
in	recipient	countries.
In	fact,	the	V4	countries	are	still	going	through	
a	 transition	 in	 their	 own	 civil	 society	 sectors,	
where	capacity	 is	 still	being	developed	 to	be	
able	to	engage	effectively	on	the	international	
stage,	 for	 instance	 to	gain	 the	attention	of	EU	
institutions	in	Brussels,	and	to	be	robust	enough	
to	 be	 major	 players	 in	 development	 aid	 and	
democracy	assistance	abroad.	
Nevertheless,	a	consistent	conclusion	 from	 the	
research	 conducted	by	 PASOS	was	 the	 need	
for	more	funding	to	go	directly	 to	NGOs	and	
individuals	 in	 the	 recipient	 countries,	 where	
there	 is	 the	 absorptive	 capacity.	 Where	 the	
capacity	 is	 lacking,	 a	 priority	 should	 be	 to	
build	sustainable	partnerships	with	local	actors	
-	 and	 to	 use	 the	 limited	 resources	 of	 the	 V4	
governments	to	maximum	effect,	for	instance	as	
matching	funding	for	grants	from	larger	donors,	
including	the	EU.
In 2006, more than € 10 million was 
deployed by the V4 governments in 
the field of democracy assistance, 
with a strong focus on support to 
Ukraine and Belarus.	This	ranks	as	a	tiny	
drop	in	the	aid	business,	compared	for	instance	
with	the	estimated	€	340	million	provided	in	the	
same	year	by	Sweden	(24% of Swedish ODA),	
the	EU's	most	generous	per	capita	supporter	of	
democracy	 around	 the	 world,	 but	 the	 2006	
figures	 rank	 better	 alongside	 France,	 whose	
€	 52	 million	 allocated	 to	 "governance"	
represented	 just	 0.7% of France's official 
development assistance	(ODA).	
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This	 compares	 with	 €	 6.5	 million	
committed	 towards	 democracy	
assistance	 by	 Poland,	 amounting	 to	
30% of Polish ODA,	 and	 an	 average	 of	
€	1.9	million	per	annum	in	Slovakia	from	2004-
2007,	amounting	to	32% of Slovak ODA.	
In	 the	Polish	 case,	 the	 funding	 for	democracy	
assistance	in	2006	more	than	tripled	compared	
with	2005	(€	1.87	million).
In recent years, the V4 governments' 
democracy assistance budgets have 
more than doubled, with	 particularly	
strong	 growth	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Poland	 and	 the	
Czech	 Republic,	 reflecting	 their	 respective	
governments'	 high-profile	 engagement	 in	
democracy	promotion,	particularly	 in	 the	case	
of	Belarus,	but	also	in	Burma	and	Cuba	in	the	
case	of	the	Czech	Republic.	
The	 available	 information	 for	 2007	 indicates	
that	 V4	 budget	 allocations	 to	 democracy	
assistance	continue	to	rise.
Democracy	 assistance	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic	
in	2006	amounted	 to	€	2	million	 (1.56% of 
Czech ODA),	up	from	€	0.57	million	(0.52%	of	
ODA)	in	2005,	while	in	Hungary	-	after	a	fall	in	
ODA	during	budget	cuts	in	2006	-	democracy	
assistance	 rose	 from	€	0.65	million	 (0.6% of 
ODA)	to	an	estimated	figure	of	€	1.25	million	
in	2007.	
Support in European 
integration is clear-cut 
niche for Visegrad Four
The	democracy	assistance	programmes	of	 the	
V4	countries	remain	at	a	relatively	early	stage	
in	 their	 formation.	Notably,	 there	 is	 a	 limited	
quantity	of	funding	and	projects	emerging	from	
the	 V4	 countries	 for	 democracy	 assistance	
towards	 some	 of	 the	 target	 countries,	 and	
assistance	is	spread	too	thinly.	
Most	 of	 the	 democracy	 assistance	 projects	
pursued	 by	 the	 V4	 donors	 are	 not	 large	 in	
scope,	 especially	when	 compared	with	 those	
supported	by	other	 international	donors	active	
in	 this	field,	such	as	 the	United	States	Agency	
for	 International	 Development	 (USAID),	 the	
Organization	 for	 Security	 and	 Cooperation	
in	 Europe	 (OSCE),	 and	 the	 Delegation	 of	
the	 European	 Commission	 to	 the	 respective	
countries	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 Ukraine	 and	 Bosnia-
and-Herzegovina,	for	instance).	
However,	 the	 relatively	 low	 visibility	 of	 V4-
sponsored	projects	may	also	indicate	that	these	
projects	are	poorly	targeted,	in	that	they	do	not	
fill	 the	gaps	 in	democracy	assistance	projects	
sponsored	by	big	donors,	 in	other	words	they	
do	 not	 sufficiently	 draw	 on	 the	 comparative	
advantages	of	the	V4	countries'	experience.
V4	 countries	 should	 narrow	 their	 focus	 to	 a	
specific	 set	 of	 issues	 where	 their	 contribution	
could	provide	most	'added	value'	to	democracy-
building	efforts.
Thus,	in	strategising	their	democracy	assistance	
to	the	target	countries,	the	V4	countries	should	
take	into	account	the	following	factors:
	
i)	 the	 level	 of	 monetary	 commitment	 by	 V4	
countries	for	democracy	assistance;	
ii)	the	 weak	 areas	 of	 democracy,	 where	 V4	
transition	 experience	 would	 be	 useful	 for	
promoting	change;	and	
iii)	 the	 activities	 of	 other	 international	 actors	
in	effecting	change	 in	weak	areas	of	a	given	
country's	 democracy,	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 the	
efforts	of	the	V4	countries	are	complimentary.	
Moreover,	the V countries should co-operate 
with local actors	already	active	in	democracy-
building	in	order	to	better	formulate	an	effective	
strategy	for	achieving	the	desired	goals	of	their	
democracy	assistance	policy.	
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
FOR VISEGRAD FOUR COUNTRIES  
IN DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE:
1. The V countries are potentially key actors 
in helping neighbouring countries with the 
EU integration process.	 They	 are	 regarded	
positively	by	local	stakeholders.	As	such,	if	the	
V4	countries	decided	to	focus	their	democracy	
assistance	 work	 in	 this	 area,	 this	 would	
undoubtedly	be	well	received	by	local	actors.	
2.	Visegrad governments should co-ordinate 
more on funding, and engage in common 
advocacy at the Brussels level to strengthen 
EU policies towards the eastern neighbours	
-	and	the	implementation	of	those	policies.	
3.	 The	 priorities	 of	 V4	 governments	 do	 not	
differ	 much	 from	 the	 priorities	 of	 USAID,	
the	 EU,	 Swedish	 International	 Development	
Cooperation	 Agency	 (SIDA)	 or	 other	 big	
donors.	The value of V support rests on the 
fact that V government and NGO experts 
have democratisation experience that is 
easily applied. 
4.	Continuity and coherence of joint projects, 
and the variety of co-operation areas: 
Whereas	 the	 co-operation	 with	 NGOs	 from	
old	 EU	member	 states	 has	 an	 ad	 hoc	 nature	
and	 the	 scope	 of	 projects	 is	 limited,	 the	 co-
operation	 with	 V4	NGOs	 has	 continuity	 and	
coherence,	and	meets	target	countries’	needs.	
Joint	projects	have	covered	various	aspects	of	
democratisation.
5. The role of the V embassies in promoting 
democracy should be given more prominence, 
and	should	be	strengthened	in	future	democracy	
assistance	 policies	 of	 the	 V4.	 The	 work	 of	
the	 V4	 embassies	 is	 generally	 regarded	 very	
positively.	
6.	One of the crucial issues for the development 
of democracy is the strengthening of the civil 
society/NGO sector.	 This	 could	prove	 to	be	
an	area	on	which	the	V4	countries	could	focus	
their	democracy	assistance	policies.	However,	
since	 a	 plethora	 of	 international	 actors	 have	
been	 very	 active	 in	 addressing	 this	 particular	
issue,	V4	activities	in	this	area	require	substantial	
co-ordination	 with	 other	 international	 actors	
involved,	as	well	as	careful	prioritising	in	terms	
of	the	types	of	assistance	and	organisations	that	
should	be	supported.
7.	 The V countries should significantly 
improve the co-ordination of their democracy 
assistance programmes, and set up a joint 
Visegrad Democracy Fund either in individual 
countries or in regions, such as the western 
Balkans. Grants	provided	by	most	embassies	are	
very	small.	If	all	four	embassies	in	a	given	target	
country	 were	 agreed	 on	 a	 particular	 project	
they	wanted	to	support	 together,	 there	is	not	a	
mechanism	or	resources	to	do	so.	Co-operation	
could	 take	 the	 form	of	 setting	up	a	permanent	
committee	of	ambassadors,	which	would	meet	
regularly	in	order	to	exchange	information	and	
co-ordinate	their	priorities	in	this	area.	
8.	The establishment of long-term partnerships 
with select NGOs in the target countries. V4	
democracy	assistance	programmes	should	help	
to	build	a	vibrant	and	sustainable	civil	society.	
In	 order	 to	 achieve	 this	 aim,	 their	 funding	
should	not	be	 limited	 to	 support	 for	 individual	
projects.	A	revised	approach	should	include	the	
establishment	of	long-term	partnerships	with	select	
NGOs,	which	might	 then	 receive	 some	multi-
year	 institutional	 funding,	enabling	 institutional	
development	of	these	NGOs	as	well	as	helping	
them	build	 the	capacity,	 sustainability	and	co-
funding	in	order	to	be	able	to	bid	successfully	
for	grants	from	larger	donors.
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9.	 V democracy assistance programmes 
should encourage co-operation between 
V civil society and target-country NGOs 
by funding projects that incorporate the 
participation of a V partner, but do not 
require the V partners to be the lead or the 
participation of at least three V partners 
(as in the case of the International Visegrad 
Fund). Additionally,	 V4	 programmes	 could	
encourage	 regional	 co-operation	by	 instituting	
trilateral	projects,	with	the	participation	of	two	
NGOs	 from	 non-V4	 countries	 and	 one	 V4	
partner.	Feedback	during	the	research	indicates	
that	both	embassies	and	target-country	NGOs	
consider	that	the	V4	countries	could	encourage	
stronger	local	ownership	of	projects.
10.	In order to better utilise their specific know-
how regarding the transition to democracy 
and European integration processes, the V 
countries should help strengthen independent 
think-tanks/policy research institutes in target 
countries,	whose	management	and	researchers	
could	 be	 trained	 through	 study	 visits	 and	
internships	 in	 their	 V4	 counterparts	 and	 who	
would	 collaborate	 with	 such	 V4	 counterparts	
on	 future	 project	 work.	 The	 emergence	 of	
effective	 independent	 think-tanks	 can	 provide	
an	 important	 stimulus	 to	 wider	 public	 debate	
and	public	participation	in	democratic	decision-
making.	
11.	 The V countries should build on 
their successful initiatives in providing 
scholarships and study visits to V countries 
for young democracy activists,	 and	 also	
assist	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	generation	 of	
democratically	oriented	citizens	by	 supporting	
youth	 and	 NGOs	 engaged	 in	 activism	 for	
democracy.	In	addition,	long-term	internships	in	
NGOs	should	be	supported.
12.	 Through sharing their own experience, 
the V countries could make a significant 
contribution to the strengthening of dialogue 
between political actors and civil society 
groups.	V4	NGOs	could	share	their	experience	
of	establishing	civic	dialogue	with	government	
in	their	respective	countries.	This	should	include	
NGO/public	 administration	 co-operation	 at	
other	levels	of	government,	and	not	just	the	state	
level.		
13.	 The V countries are uniquely placed, 
through sharing the know-how acquired in 
their own EU accession, to assist neighbouring 
countries in the process of European 
integration. EU	 candidate	 and	 Stabilisation	
and	 Association	 Agreement	 (SAA)	 signatory	
governments	 receive	 an	 annual	 report	 on	 the	
respective	country’s	progress	towards	fulfilling	EU	
requirements	for	the	accession	process.	There	is	
a	section	within	the	report	that	addresses	issues	
related	to	democracy	strengthening.	That	report	
could	be	used	as	an	inspiration	for	the	setting	
of	 the	 priorities	 of	 V4	 democracy	 assistance	
related	to	EU	integration.	V4	grants	should	also	
assist	 target-country	NGOs	 in	 bidding	 for	 EU	
grants,	for	example,	by	providing	local	NGOs	
with	the	required	matching	funding.
	
14.	V countries should continue their peer 
pressure on target-country politicians for 
further democratisation,	 and	 in	 the	 western	
Balkans	and	Ukraine	 remain	advocates	of	 the	
respective	 countries'	 European	 aspirations,	 at	
the	same	time	promoting/supporting	the	idea	of	
using	what	is	on	offer	from	the	EU	(e.g.	deep	free	
trade,	border	management	and	migration,	etc.	
both	within	the	EU	and	the	respective	countries).	
They	 should	 provide	 more	 expert	 support	 to	
alignment	 with	 EU	 norms	 and	 standards	 in	
the	framework,	for	 instance,	of	 the	EU-Ukraine	
enhanced	agreement	(especially	regarding	the	
rule	 of	 law	 and	 independent	 judiciary),	 and	
identify	areas	of	alignment	with	the	EU	acquis	
communautaire	 that	 could	 be	 supported	 from	
funds	within	bilateral	assistance.
www.pasos.org
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Target countries for 
democracy assistance
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Data available 
for 2005-
2006. In 
2004, only 
projects in Iraq 
???????
???????????
????????
??????? 2004-6:
????????
?????????????
?????????????
??????????
????????????
???????? ???????
???????? ???????
Target
countries for 
democracy
assistance
??????
??????????
???????????
???????????
???????
??????????
???????
????????
????????
???????????
????????????
???????????
??????
???????????
????????
????????
???????
???????????
?????????????
???????????
???????
????
??????????
??????????
?????????????
?????
??????
???????????
???????????
??????
??????????
??????????
??????????
?????????
????????
?????
?????????
????
???????????
????
????????
2008:
??????
????????
???????
???????
????
??????????
?????????
???????????

www.pasos.org
Po
lic
y 
Br
ie
f N
o.
2
, 
2
0
0
8
4.	 	 	 An enhanced V co-operation could 
be formalised in Belarus. In order to avoid 
duplication and inadvertent competition 
among them, the V countries should co-
ordinate their policies but also pool resources 
by setting up a special fund for Belarus.	 In	
effect,	 the	 activities	 of	 such	 a	 fund	 could	 be	
less	politically	controversial	in	Belarus	than	the	
activities	 of	 national	 governments,	 especially	
Poland.	 Thus	 it	 would	 be	 less	 vulnerable	 to	
propaganda	attacks	by	the	Lukashenko	regime.	
It	 should	 not	 be	 a	 replacement	 for	 national	
priorities	or	 national	 funding	by	 the	 individual	
V4	 governments,	 but	 supplementary	 to	 them,	
and	a	forum	for	knowledge	exchange	and	co-
ordination.
5.	 	 	 A new democratic elite should be 
fostered in Belarus.	 Towards	 this	 goal,	
scholarship	 programmes	 should	 be	 made	
an	 even	 greater	 priority	 for	 V4	 democracy	
assistance.	Priority	should	be	given	to	students	
expelled	 from	 Belarussian	 universities	 for	
political	 reasons.		This	could	also	be	handled	
either	by	a	dedicated	V4	Fund	 for	Belarus	or	
through	 the	 International	 Visegrad	 Fund,	 as	
for	 example	 is	 currently	 the	 case	 in	 Ukraine.	
Scholarship	programmes	should	be	prioritised:	
law,	 sociology,	 political	 science,	 EU	 studies,	
international	 relations,	 public	 administration,	
law,	 economics	 and	 public	 policy	 should	 be	
the	priorities.	 In	addition,	 long-term	 internships	
in	NGOs,	government	 institutions,	media	and	
commercial	 companies	 should	 be	 supported.	
Again,	 beneficiaries	 of	 such	 internships	 could	
include	people	who	have	lost	their	jobs	due	to	
political	reasons.
RECOMMENDATIONS  
FOR VISEGRAD FOUR DEMOCRACY 
ASSISTANCE POLICIES TO BELARUS:
1.	 	 V governments should co-ordinate 
more, and continue the pressure on Belarus 
for democratisation and human rights at the 
bilateral and multilateral level, including EU, 
OSCE and Council of Europe. Such	pressure	
should	 be	 accompanied	 by	 the	 positive	
incentives	 addressed	 to	 Belarus	 including	 the	
prospects	of	EU	membership	of	Belarus	under	
the	condition	of	fulfilment	of	respective	criteria	if	
it	will	be	the	wish	of	the	Belarusian	people.	
2.	 	 Co-operation with today's Belarusian 
authorities should be developed only after a 
significant improvement of the situation in the 
field of human rights.	As	recent	developments	
have	 shown,	 a	 minimum	 requirement	 of	 the	
international	community	should	be	not	only	the	
release	 of	 political	 prisoners	 but	 also	 serious	
measures	 towards	 the	 liberalisation	 of	 public	
life,	 and	 at	 least	 the	 abolishment	 of	 the	 so-
called	“counter-revolutionary	laws”,	adopted	in	
2005.
3.		 It is necessary to increase co-operation in 
policy towards Belarus between the V states 
in information exchange and co-ordination 
of donor policies.	On	the	political	 level,	 their	
natural	 partners	 are	 Lithuania,	 Latvia	 and	 the	
Scandinavian	 states,	 and	 the	 V4	 should	 try	
to	 establish	 at	 least	 a	 consultative	 forum	 on	
donor	policy	 together	with	German	donors	as	
well.	 Such	 an	 approach	 would	 increase	 the	
“European”	dimension	of	 the	V4	donor	policy	
towards	Belarus	and	increase	the	EU	presence	
in	the	country.
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9.	 	 Consultation on the V level between 
the officers responsible for democracy 
assistance policy and the representatives of 
V and Belarusian NGOs will contribute to 
increasing the transparency of the donors’ 
policies	towards	Belarus.	
10.	Continuity of successful projects supported 
in the framework of democracy assistance is 
needed.	 It	 will	 improve	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	
Belarusian	NGO	sector	as	well	as	the	reputation	
of	the	western	donors'	community.
11. An increased share of the financial 
resources designed for Belarus projects should 
go directly to the Belarusian partners.	Donors'	
media	initiatives	in	Belarus,	for	instance,	should	
seek	to	involve	greater	local	ownership.
12.	 V governments should expand small 
grants programmes provided directly by  their 
respective embassies	or	-	if	established	-	by	the	
International	Visegrad	Fund	for	Belarus.
13.	 Engage representatives of Belarusian 
NGOs in the discussion of assistance priorities 
of the V countries in order to match their 
priorities more to the needs of local society,	
and	 to	 improve	 V4	 knowledge	 of	 domestic	
political	developments.	
14.	There is an unmet need for underground 
survival training.	 There	 have	 been	 countless	
trainings	 on	 advocacy	 and	 media	 work,	 but	
next	 to	no	training	on	how	to	protect	sensitive	
computer	data	from	raids	by	the	authorities.
15.	 Raise the level of quality of project 
proposals demanded by V donors in order to 
increase the transparency and responsibility 
on the part of Belarusian civil society.	 In	
the	 case	 of	 newly	 established	 organisations	
without	 experience	 in	 project	 management,	
some	 “positive	 discrimination”	 could	 be	
allowed	 for	 a	 first	 project,	 if	 combined	 with	
project	 management	 training	 for	 subsequent	
applications.		
6.			Donors should abandon the requirement 
of recipients providing their own financial 
contribution. A	 persistent	 problem	 of	 several	
donors,	e.g.	SIDA	or	the	European	Commission,	
is	the	requirement	for	co-financing,	even	though	
this	requirement	now	appears	less	frequently	than	
in	the	past.	This	is	a	case	of	double	standards	by	
donors,	which	encourages	'creative	accounting'	
and	 other	 dubious	 practices.	Other	 obstacles	
are	 posed	 by	 excessive	 red	 tape.	 Larger	
organisations	 are	 able	 to	 ensure	 their	 own	
contribution	thanks	to	their	offices	or	personnel,	
including	volunteers	but,	on	the	other	hand,	such	
a	 requirement	 excludes	 smaller	 organisations	
from	obtaining	a	grant.	The	European	Radio	for	
Belarus	broadcasting	project	is	a	special	case,	
because	 the	donors'	project-financing	structure	
often	meets	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 given	 project	 in	
a	very	limited	way,	as	more	than	50	per	cent	
of	 the	budget	comprises	 rental	 costs	of	 sound	
broadcasting	 transmitters	 on	 the	 territory	 of	
Poland,	Ukraine,	Lithuania	and	Latvia.	
7.		In	spite	of	the	current	isolation	of	civil	society	
in	Belarus,	the	attempts	to	overcome	this	isolation	
must	 not	be	abandoned.	New target groups 
demanding political and economic changes 
should be identified,	 like	 small	 and	medium-
sized	entrepreneurs,	young	urban	professionals,	
environmental	activists,	etc.
8.			Given	the	current	situation	of	civil	society	in	
Belarus,	a	diversification	of	the	donors’	policies	
is	required.	There is a need to involve a wider 
spectrum of Belarusian NGOs in discussions 
about future policies on democracy promotion 
in Belarus, including cultural or community 
initiatives. As well as the “traditional” 
NGOs focused on human rights protection, 
Belarusian society needs alternative projects 
focusing on the country’s future -	a	necessary	
condition	of	which	would	be	the	creation	of	a	
new	democratic	elite	prepared	for	a	change	in	
the	political	constellation.	Democracy	assistance	
should	be	focused	on	long-term	activities	and,	
in	the	current	political	situation	in	the	country,	it	
should	focus	on	the	process	of	gradual	change	
of	the	political	and	economic	climate	in	Belarus.	
Another	field	identified	by	our	research	in	need	
of	 support	 is	 free	 information	 exchange,	 i.e.	
independent	media	available	to	a	larger	share	
of	the	Belarusian	population.
10
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19.	The	V4	countries	should	repeatedly	make	
use	 of	 the	 comparative	 advantage	 of	 V4	
NGOs	related	to	the	fact	that	they	come	from	
transition	 countries	 and	 can	 better	 appreciate	
the	 conditions	 of	 working	 in	 a	 country	 like	
Belarus,	with	an	autocratic	regime	not	dissimilar	
to	 the	 communist	 regimes	 in	 central	 Europe	
in	 the	 1980s.	 In	 particular,	 the 'negotiated 
transitions' to democracy in 1 could 
provide lessons and offer inspiration for 
democratic change in Belarus. 
20.	Establish mechanisms for quick funding 
decisions or more flexible institutional and 
project funding	 -	 so	 that	 projects	 can	be	put	
into	action	quickly	 (in	particular,	ahead	of	 the	
parliamentary	elections	due	in	October	2008)
	
	
16.	 Strike a balance between financing 
project implementation and institutional 
development of NGOs.
17.	 Sustain the even-handed approach 
generally adopted by V donors in their 
approach towards Belarusian partners, 
so	 that	 they	 do	 not	 adopt	 the	 approaches	
of	 less	 constructive	 donors	 or	 partners	 who	
have	a	 tendency	 to	discount	 local	needs	and	
conditions.
18.	 Regular independent monitoring of 
project implementation	 in	 order	 to	 increase	
the	 transparency	of	 the	democracy	assistance	
provided	to	Belarus.	
www.pasos.org
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR  
VISEGRAD FOUR DEMOCRACY 
ASSISTANCE POLICIES TO BOSNIA  
AND HERZEGOVINA:
1.	 The V countries should significantly 
improve the co-ordination of their democracy 
assistance programmes, and set up a joint 
Visegrad Democracy Fund for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH). Co-operation	 could	 take	
the	 form	of	 setting	up	a	permanent	committee	
of	 ambassadors	 in	 BiH,	 which	 would	 meet	
regularly	in	order	to	exchange	information	and	
co-ordinate	their	priorities	in	 this	area.	A	long-
term	 and	 potentially	 more	 effective	 solution	
would	be	to	set	up	a	joint	Visegrad	Democracy	
Fund	for	BiH,	or	joint	grants	from	the	Visegrad	
embassies	 (to	 economise	 on	 their	 grant	
administration	 costs,	 and	 to	 pool	 their	 limited	
resources).	 Centralisation	 of	 grant	 decision-
making	 in	 their	 respective	 capitals	 should	 be	
decentralised	 on	 the	 proviso	 that	 Embassy	
staffing	is	strengthened	to	manage	the	process,	
or	 a	 joint	 agency	 established	 to	manage	 the	
grants	procedure.	Such	a	 fund	would	 support	
projects	 by	 BiH	NGOs	 active	 in	 democracy-
building,	implemented	in	co-operation	with	V4	
civil	society	organisations.
2.	The role of the V embassies in promoting 
democracy in BiH should be given more 
prominence, and should be strengthened in 
future democracy assistance policies of the 
V. The	 work	 of	 the	 Slovak,	 Hungarian	 and	
Czech	 Embassies	 in	 BiH	 is	 regarded	 very	
positively.	 The	 NGO	 recipients	 of	 projects	
sponsored	 by	 these	 embassies	 have	 spoken	
highly	about	the	co-operation	of	the	respective	
embassy	 representatives.	 	 Moreover,	 the	
Slovak,	 Hungarian	 and	 Czech	 Ambassadors	
have	 consistently	 been	 praised	 for	 their	
involvement	in	issues	related	to	democratisation	
in	BiH.	Their	knowledge	of	the	local	language	
also	marks	 them	out	 in	a	positive	 light,	so	 the	
embassies	should	be	given	a	higher	profile	 in	
V4	democracy	assistance	efforts.	
3.	The establishment of long-term partnerships 
with select NGOs in BiH.	 V4	 democracy	
assistance	 programmes	 should	 help	 to	 build	
a	vibrant	and	 sustainable	civil	 society	 in	BiH.	
In	 order	 to	 achieve	 this	 aim,	 their	 funding	
should	not	be	 limited	 to	 support	 for	 individual	
projects.	A	revised	approach	should	include	the	
establishment	of	long-term	partnerships	with	select	
NGOs,	which	might	 then	 receive	 some	multi-
year	 institutional	 funding,	enabling	 institutional	
development	of	these	NGOs	as	well	as	helping	
them	build	 the	capacity,	 sustainability	and	co-
funding	in	order	to	be	able	to	bid	successfully	
for	grants	from	larger	donors.
4.	 V democracy assistance programmes 
should encourage co-operation between 
V civil society and BiH NGOs by funding 
projects that incorporate the participation of 
a V partner. Additionally,	 V4	 programmes	
could	 encourage	 regional	 co-operation	 in	 the	
Balkans	by	instituting	trilateral	projects,	with	the	
participation	of	at	least	one	NGO	from	BiH,	one	
from	a	V4	country	and	one	from	another	Balkan	
country.	V4	countries	should	move	away	 from	
the	approach	where	primary	 funding	goes	 to	
partner	NGOs	from	V4	countries	to	supporting	
more	 BiH	 NGOs,	 and	 building	 up	 local	
ownership	and	local	institutional	capacity.
5.	In order to better utilise their specific know-
how regarding the transition to democracy 
and European integration processes, the V 
countries should help strengthen independent 
think-tanks/policy research institutes in BiH,	
whose	management	and	researchers	could	be	
trained	through	study	visits	and	internships	in	their	
V4	 counterparts,	 and	who	would	 collaborate	
with	 such	 V4	 counterparts	 on	 future	 project	
work.	The	emergence	of	effective	independent	
think-tanks	can	provide	an	important	stimulus	to	
wider	public	debate	and	public	participation	in	
democratic	decision-making.
1
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8.	 Finally, the V countries are uniquely 
placed, through sharing the know-how 
acquired in their own EU accession, to assist 
BiH in the process of European integration.	
The	BiH	government	receives	an	annual	report	
on	 the	 country’s	 progress	 towards	 fulfilling	 EU	
requirements	for	the	accession	process.	There	is	
a	section	within	the	report	that	addresses	issues	
related	to	democracy	strengthening.	That	report	
could	be	used	as	an	inspiration	for	the	setting	of	
the	priorities	of	V4	democracy	assistance	related	
to	 EU	 integration.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 V4	
grants	should	also	assist	BiH	NGOs	in	bidding	
for	EU	grants,	for	example,	by	providing	local	
NGOs	with	the	required	matching	funding.
	
6.	 The V countries should provide 
scholarships and study visits to V countries 
for young democracy activists,	 and	 also	
assist	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	 generation	
of	 democratically	 oriented	 citizens	 of	 BiH	
by	 supporting	 youth	 and	NGOs	 engaged	 in	
activism	for	democracy.
7.	 Through sharing their own experience, 
the V countries could make a significant 
contribution to the strengthening of dialogue 
between political actors and civil society 
groups in BiH. Although	 substantial	 progress	
has	been	made	on	this	issue	with	the	adoption	
of	 the	Agreement	between	the	BiH	Council	of	
Ministers	and	the	NGO	Sector,	implementation	
of	 this	 agreement	will	 be	 difficult.	 V4	NGOs	
could	share	their	experience	of	establishing	civic	
dialogue	 with	 government	 in	 their	 respective	
countries.	 This	 should	 include	 NGO/public	
administration	 co-operation	 at	 other	 levels	 of	
government,	and	not	just	the	state	level.		
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR VISEGRAD 
FOUR DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE 
POLICIES TO CUBA:
1.	Putting Cuba on the list of priority countries 
receiving democracy assistance, as well 
as earmarking substantial funding for this 
purpose, would enable the NGOs from V 
countries active in Cuba to diversify their 
funding from US sources,	 which	 has	 often	
constrained	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 their	 actions	
and	allowed	the	Cuban	regime	(as	well	as	its	
sympathisers	 in	 Europe	 and	 elsewhere)	 to	 try	
to	discredit	their	work	in	the	eyes	of	the	Cuban	
and	international	public.
2.	 V countries should lobby together 
for greater EU engagement in supporting 
democratic developments in Cuba. Such 
lobbying to build a coalition of like-minded 
countries is urgently needed to contain an 
EU political trend increasingly in favour 
of a ‘wait and see’ position in light of the 
economic reforms Raul Castro is planning.	
Any	diplomatic	achievement	in	Brussels	will	be	
the	 result	 of	 co-ordinated	 efforts.	 V4	 countries	
should	 try	 to	build	a	broader	coalition	of	 like-
minded	 EU	members	 in	 favour	 of	 democratic	
Cuba.
3.	 Improving relations with more moderate 
elements of the Cuban establishment in view of 
a potential negotiated transition to democracy 
should not be ruled out.	 Nevertheless,	 any	
such	 improvement	 must	 be	 accompanied	 by	
continued	moral,	political	and	material	support	
for	dissidents.
4.	V4	countries	should	insist	that	any significant 
assistance to, and political improvements in 
relations with, the Cuban government must 
be accompanied by visible improvements in 
human rights conditions	on	the	island.
5.	 V embassies on the island should be 
given an increased role in implementing 
democracy assistance in Cuba, as	 well	 as	
serve	as	‘windows	to	the	world’	for	Cubans.	
6.	The lack of co-ordination among the current 
(mainly US) donors affects the effectiveness of 
democracy assistance. More	contacts	among	
donors	 and	 implementers	 would	 translate	
into	 better	 exchanges	 of	 good	 practices	 and	
improved	understanding	of	the	real	needs	of	the	
Cuban	opposition	and	population.	This	should	
also	be	a	 lesson	 to	any	prospective	providers	
of	democracy	assistance	for	Cuba,	such	as	V4	
governments.
7.	The duplication of assistance to the same 
organisations, and for similar projects, 
should not be a taboo any more. A virtuous 
competition of ideas and solutions to problems 
can only be an asset,	 provided	 that	 it	 is	
preceded	and	followed	by	better	co-ordination	
among	the	donors	themselves.
8.	 The monitoring of the actual use of 
the funding must be carried out in a more 
structured and effective way,	 provided	 that	
this	increased	transparency	does	not	present	a	
security	risk.
9.	When possible, the transfer of money to 
Cuba should be carried out in Euros and not 
in US dollars. The	Cuban	authorities	apply	a	
20%	tax	on	the	currency	exchanges	from	dollars	
(but	not	from	Euros).	That	means	that	20%	of	US	
money	bound	to	Cuban	dissidents	goes	to	the	
regime.
10.	It is necessary to have better co-ordination 
among the actors engaged in Cuba. This 
would have an immediate positive outcome in 
terms of the effectiveness and relevance of the 
assistance delivered to Cubans. The	problems	
of	 duplication,	 or	 prolonged	 absences,	 of	
support	 to	different	dissidents	must	 be	 tackled	
urgently.	At	the	same	time,	the	NGOs	continue	
to	be	free	to	choose	among	the	representatives	
of	the	opposition	whom	they	help.
1
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11.	 The selection of goods to be delivered 
to dissidents must be conceived in a more 
responsive way, making sure that they meet 
the real needs of the dissidents.	 In	 working	
towards	 this	 goal,	 it	 is	 advisable	 to	 increase,	
when	 possible,	 communications	 with	 the	
recipients,	 in	 particular	 during	 the	 period	
immediately	before	delivery.
12.	In	general,	communications	with	dissidents	
must	be	 improved.	Cubans have to be more 
involved in the decision-making process, 
according	 to	 which	 assistance	 projects	 are	
determined.
13.	The	cultural	appetite	of	the	Cuban	people	is	
increasing. Access to cultural material is more 
important than ever. Taking	 into	 account	 the	
difficulties	of	bringing	these	goods	to	the	island,	
the	diversity	of	 the	material	delivered	needs	 to	
be	increased.	Again	and	again,	multiple	copies	
of	the	same	books	can	be	found	on	the	shelves	
of	 independent	 libraries.	 The	 delivery	 of	 films	
banned	by	the	authorities	is	more	important	than	
ever	-	such	films	can	send	important	messages	to	
bigger	and	not	necessarily	politicised	groups	of	
Cubans.	Two	examples	of	films	about	the	former	
East	 Germany	 (GDR)	 with	 this	 potential	 are	
‘Goodbye Lenin’ and	‘The Life of the Others’.	The	
recent	‘liberalisation’	of	DVD	players	represents	
an	important	opportunity	in	this	sense.	
14.	The	success	of	projects aimed at training 
and organising groups of experts,	 such	 as	
teachers	or	journalists,	should	be	coupled	with	
other	 similar	 initiatives,	 in	 particular	 involving	
those	groups	of	society	that	are	often	neglected.	
For	example,	it	would	be	of	great	importance	to	
involve youth organisations.
15.	The spreading of critical thinking inside 
Cuban society must be increased with the use 
of new channels and milder, non-politicised 
messages. With	 this	 purpose	 and	 without	
forgetting	 the	 related	 dangers,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	
encourage	 dissidents	 to	 literally	 leave	 their	
houses	 and	 develop	 some	 public-oriented	
activities.	 Civil	 society	 groups	 must	 also	 be	
increasingly	 supported.	Cuban	 intellectuals	 or	
musicians	that	already	send	nuanced	messages	
should	be	supported.	In	particular,	the	potential	
of	music	as	a	revolutionary	tool	should	not	be	
ignored.
16.	 The fragmentation of the Cuban 
opposition is a major problem that must be 
tackled.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	very	important	to	
train	dissidents	and	experts	 in	different	sectors	
not	only	to	act	in	the	current	situation,	but	also	
to	prepare	for	a	transitional	scenario.
17.		Campaigning	in	Europe	to	raise	awareness	
about	 the	real	Cuban	situation	 is	of	enormous	
importance,	 but	 has	 to	 be	 done	 without	
forgetting	the	sensitiveness	of	Europeans	about	
the	topic,	manifested	often	in	reactions	towards	
a	perceived	negative	US	foreign	policy.	The risk 
of being branded as American mercenaries 
and ideologically driven is very real, and 
makes it all the more necessary to take a very 
cautious approach to the subject.
18.	Organisations operating in Cuba need to 
keep a low public profile in Europe to avoid 
security risks for their missions on the island. 
The	best	solution	would	be	to	improve	relations	
between	V4	NGOs	active	in	the	direct	support	
to	Cubans	and	the	ones	more	active	in	public	
awareness	campaigning	in	Europe.	This	would	
allow	a	virtuous	exchange	of	know-how	without	
endangering	activities	in	Cuba.
19.	 Lobbying in Brussels must become a 
priority in particular for the NGOs who 
specialise in campaigning.	A	seat	in	Brussels	
and	a	well-developed	network	of	EU	institutions’	
contacts	 are	 a	 pre-condition	 for	 any	 further	
action.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR VISEGRAD 
FOUR DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE 
POLICIES TO UKRAINE:
1.	Provide more expert support to Ukraine’s 
alignment with EU norms and standards in 
the framework of EU-Ukraine enhanced 
agreement (especially	regarding	the	rule	of	law	
and	independent	judiciary)
2.	 Increase	 democracy	 assistance	 support	 to	
Ukraine,	and	resist temptation to shift resources 
away from civil society development to 
technical assistance 
3.	V4	countries	should	impress on the Ukrainian 
government the need to fund NGOs from the 
state budget as agents to implement public 
policy,	 as	 NGOs	 often	 have	 more	 expertise	
(including	on	EU	integration)
4.	Build on the opportunity presented by the 
appointment of a deputy prime minister for 
European integration	 to	 work	 with	 V4	 and	
Ukraine	NGOs	to	move	from	the	current	"shallow	
consensus"	 in	 Ukraine	 to	 build	 an	 "European"	
awareness	of	Ukrainian	society	concerning	EU	
integration
5.	 Engage	 with	 NGOs	 in	 the	 public	 policy	
arena	to	spread public awareness and debate 
about NATO membership, and to foster 
more in-depth Ukrainian policy perspectives 
towards Russia
6.	Invest in institutional support to build strong 
NGOs that can be partners of European 
organisations and can build the capacity 
of other Ukrainian NGOs;	 this	 should	 be	
combined	with	money	to	be	spent	on	enabling	
Ukrainian	NGO	leaders	 to	network	with,	and	
share	experience	of,	Visegrad/	EU	NGOs
7.	Since	the	alignment	with	the	EU	acquis	will	
have	serious	financial	implications	for	Ukraine,	
identify areas that could be supported from 
funds within bilateral assistance to Ukraine.
8.	 Encourage government agencies of V 
countries to participate in EU-funded twinning 
projects with the Ukrainian government,	
building	on	the	valued	V4	experience	of	making	
local	government	work	effectively		
9.	Study	the	possibility	of	a	change of approach 
to democracy assistance to enable Ukrainian 
NGOs to apply for MFA funds directly 
10.	Engage the representatives of Ukrainian 
NGOs in discussions about assistance 
priorities 	
11.	 Increase the number of scholarships for 
Ukrainian students	 to	 enable	 them	 to	 learn	
about	democracy	by	studying	and	living	in	V4	
countries	
12.	Scholarships should also be targeted at 
building expertise in parliament, government 
and the NGO sector.	
13.	Include social aspects of democratisation 
(e.g.	assistance	to	ethnic	minorities,	human	rights	
and	minority	rights)	as	assistance	priorities.
14.	 Engage Ukrainian government and 
NGOs in assistance initiatives for other 
countries-in-need	(e.g.	Belarus)
15.	Direct V democracy assistance to regions 
of Ukraine that remain underdeveloped	and	
have	to	date	received	less	assistance.	
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